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ON FORMAL JUSTICE*
David Lyonst
A number of legal and political theorists have suggested that public officials who fail to act within the law that they administer act unjustly. This does not mean that injustice is always likely to be done
merely because it often happens to be done when officials depart from
the law. Some writers have held that injustice is done whenever an
official fails to act within the law, regardless of the circumstances.' I
shall call this type of view "formal justice."
Such a view may be considered "formalistic" because it places
value, in the name of justice, on adherence to existing legal rules without regard to "substantive" factors such as their contents, the consequences of obeying them, their defects or virtues, or any other circumstances of their application. The only condition imposed is that an
official must by law follow the rule in his official capacity. Furthermore, those who attempt to account for this view believe that the requirements of formal justice rest directly on such notions as "proceeding
by rule" or "treating like cases alike," which are thought to be at the
heart of our shared concept of justice. The basic requirements of formal justice are thus supposed to be exempt from the controversy over
substantive principles of justice and their possible justification. It is
* This article was begun during the author's tenure as a Guggenheim Foundation
Fellow at University College, London, and completed while he was a Fellow of the
Society for the Humanities at Cornell University. The author would like to thank
Professor Robert S. Summers of the Cornell Law School for his help and encouragement.
t Professor of Philosophy, Cornell University. A.B. 1960, Brooklyn College; M.A.,
Ph.D. 1963, Harvard University.
I See, e.g., S. BENN 9: R. PETEs, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 128-29 (1965);
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 155-57 (1961); H. KEIsEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAw
AND STATE 14 (A. Wedberg transl. 1949); C. PERELMAN, THE IDEA OF JUSTCE AND THE
PROBLEM OF ARGuMENT 1-87 (J. Petrie transl. 1963); A. Ross, ON LAw AND JusMCE 273, 280

(1959).
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believed that one can embrace formal justice without committing oneself to "ideological" positions. The arguments seeking to ground formal justice on such notions also make circumstances irrelevant to its
requirements, which accounts for their formalistic character.
I
THE THEORY OF FORMAL JUSTCE
Formal justice is the latest in a line of legalistic theories. One
often mentioned view, ascribed to some famous writers, identifies justice with conformity to law. Hobbes, for example, is noted for stating
that "no law can be unjust, ' 2 and for suggesting that justice and injustice apply only to acts under the law, never to the laws themselves.3
This view fits nicely with his claim that the word "just" is "equivalent"
to the expression "he that in his actions observes the laws of his country." -' Austin has said, "By the epithet just, we mean that a given object, to which we apply the epithet, accords with a given law to which
we refer to it as a test ....By the epithet unjust, we mean that the given
object conforms not to the given law."5
These statements suggest a radical conception of justice. First, if
they are correct, then we must be utterly confused when we describe
laws as unjust-perhaps even when we call them just. Hobbes and
Austin seem to be saying that moral appraisal of law in terms of justice exceeds the logical limits of the notion. Second, the suggested view
has alarming moral implications, for an unjust act is wrong, morally
wrong, unless it can be justified by overriding considerations. Other
things being equal, injustice should not be done. But the idea that
justice consists in conformity to law then implies, on the one hand,
that deviation from the law is always wrong, unless it can be justified
on other grounds, and, on the other hand, that no such justification
could be based on the injustice of the law, since a law cannot be unjust. This does not mean that noncompliance must always be judged
morally wrong, for one who believes that justice consists in conformity
2 T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN: PARTS I AND II, ch. 30, at 271 (H.W. Schneider ed. 1958).
H.L.A. Hart cites this quotation as evidence that Hobbes was tempted by the view in
question. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 1, at 251.
3 T. HOBBES, supra note 2, ch. 13, at 108.
4 Id. ch. 4, at 39.
5 J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURSPRUDENcE DErE mINED 262 n.23 (I. Berlin, S. Hampshire & R. Wollheim eds. 1954) (emphasis in original). Edgar Bodenheimer cites this
quotation as evidence that Austin holds the view in question. See E. BODENHEIMER,
TREATISE ON JUSTICE 13-14 (1967).
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to law may recognize other moral considerations that support noncompliance. But the view nevertheless does seem to stack the moral
cards in favor of conformity.
Few contemporary legal theorists would accept this identification
of justice with conformity to law, and it is doubtful if any legal theorist ever meant it literally. One might be tempted to mouth such slogans when "law" is understood to cover the so-called "moral law,"
for this includes those extralegal principles that determine when a
law is just or unjust. Discussion of formal justice in these terms may
cause some confusion, but if so understood the view clearly loses its
distinctness and bite. If the view is not watered down, it has an obviously unacceptable implication, namely, that a law cannot be unjust
-that it makes no sense to speak of an unjust law. But the appraisal
of laws as just or unjust seems as intelligible and legitimate as the
appraisal of official actions in administering the law, and no one denies that the latter can be just or unjust.
It is worth noting that Austin apparently never held such a view,
and it is doubtful that Hobbes did. Austin argues in Hobbes's defense
and thereby provides his own: Hobbes's statement that "no law can be
unjust" should not be taken as the "immoral and pernicious paradox"
it superficially seems to be." In context, Austin claims, it may be seen
that Hobbes meant only that "no positive law is legally unjust," which
Austin regards as "merely a truism put in unguarded terms."'7 The
evidence is, however, somewhat equivocal. As Austin reminds us,
Hobbes also wrote that laws are not always good since they do not
always serve the people's needs.8 It does not follow, however, that
Hobbes believed that such laws should be called "unjust." He might
subject laws to utilitarian appraisal while refusing to regard the appraisal as a measure of the peculiar virtue of justice. However, Hobbes
also states that justice consists fundamentally in the "performance of
covenants." A full explication of his theory would, I think, show that
he regarded conformity to law as only a derivative requirement of
justice within civil society, and even then within the limits of the
social contract. The evidence is clear enough in Austin's case, for Austin was, of course, no legalistic skeptic but a utilitarian who maintained that valid moral principles have divine sanction. Ironically, his
defense of Hobbes begins with the very passage that is sometimes
6
7
8
9

J. AUSTIN, supra note 5, at 260 n.23.
Id. at 261 n.23 (emphasis in original).
T. HoBBES, supra note 2, ch. 30, at 272; see J. AustIN, supra note 5, at 261 n.23.
T. HOBBES, supra note 2, ch. 15, at 119; id. ch. 26, at 212.
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quoted to show that he identifies justice with conformity to law. 10 The
context of the passage makes clear that Austin defined "law" as any
general rule, legal or extralegal, that is applied as a standard of appraisal, including "the ultimate measure or test: namely, the law of
God," which when applied to law "is nearly equivalent to general
utility."'1 Such a theory may not generate much enthusiasm today, but
it would be closer to Austin's true sentiments than the view sometimes
ascribed to him.
At any rate, the idea that justice consists in conformity to law (in
the ordinary sense of the word "law," meaning what Austin calls "positive law") is not easily subdued. Something like it is implicit in various
current conceptions of justice and legal ideals. It may even be found
incorporated in the seemingly innocuous claim that justice in the administration of the law consists in impartial application of the law to
particular cases. The result is what I call formal justice. This view
identifies conformity to law not with justice overall but with justice
in the administration of the law, and thus with justice in the conduct
of public officials.
It is important to separate formalistic tendencies from other tendencies among recent writers, especially from the trend toward moral
skepticism, for this particular combination results in extreme positions, and a formalist need not be a moral skeptic. Extreme variations
on the formalistic theme are suggested by Kelsen, Ross, and Perelman.
Whereas the early "legal positivists," Bentham and Austin, regarded
certain extralegal principles as rationally defensible and thus valid for
appraising legal institutions, the more recent writers maintain a skeptical view of ethics that has been associated with philosophical positivism in this century ("logical positivism"). They see disagreement
about extralegal principles to be used for judging law as evidence of
subjectivity in such judgments because they assume that "objective"
questions can be settled by "empirical" means which have no place
in ethics except when questions of principle are begged. Thus, Kelsen despairs of finding any rational way of choosing among alternative
resolutions of conflicting interests and declares that "[j]ustice is an
irrational ideal."' 2 However, he does believe that a rationally defensible element can be salvaged, although it concerns only the application of the laws, not the laws themselves. This element he identifies
10 J. AUSTIN, supra note 5, at 260 n.23.
11 Id. at 263 n.23 (emphasis omitted).
12 H. KELSEN, supra note 1, at 13.
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with "legality," which requires adherence to the law without exception. 13
Ross regards the idea of justice as "a demand for equality,"1 4 but
he maintains the impossibility of finding any rational way of deciding among competing criteria of like treatment and like cases. He
settles for "[t]he ideal of equality as such," or "justice in [a] formal
sense," which stands for "regularity."'u He concludes that "the idea of
justice resolves itself into the demand that a decision should be the result of the application of a general rule. Justice is the correct application of a law, as opposed to arbitrariness."'u Ross's reason for supposing
that this conclusion requires official conformity to law is similar to
Kelsen's: so far as the laws are given, decisions made by applying them
can at least be based upon "observable facts." 17
Perelman expressed similar views in his early writings."8 He based
the requirement that officials conform to the law upon the precept
"treat like cases alike," which he held to be the kernel of our shared
concept of justice and thus something common to all substantive standards, however divergent or indefensible. 19 This precept was understood by Perelman to require scrupulous adherence to law by public
officials as the sole rationally defensible requirement of justice.2 0 The
result is a formalistic view of justice in both content and ground.
These views are comparable to the theory ascribed to Hobbes and
Austin. Kelsen, Ross, and Perelman recognize that laws may be judged
just or unjust only by reference to extralegal standards; the law cannot
be the measure of its own morality. Thus, they acknowledge a distinction between the justice of laws and justice in their administration,
which suggests the possibility of arguing against official compliance
with the law when, for example, the laws to be applied are substantially
unjust. But they exclude this possibility by regarding extralegal standards as arbitrary and indefensible. They recognize valid judgments
about justice in the administration of the law, but none about the justice of the laws themselves. Because they are skeptical of moral principles generally (except for the requirements of formal justice, which
13 Id. at

14
15
16
17

14.

A. Ross, supra note 1, at 269.
Id. at 273.
Id. at 280.
Id. at 284; cf. H. KrsEN, supra note 12, at 13.
18 See C. PERELMAN, supra note 1, at 15-16, 25-26, 86-45, 50-56.
19 Id. at 16, 29, 3641.
20 Id. at 20, 25, 41, 43, 62.
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are conceived of as a special case), they must believe that no sound
moral arguments could favor official deviation from the law when formal administrative justice opposes it. Thus, they seem committed to
the view that official departure from the law cannot possibly be justified
under any circumstances. Although emotional outbursts may be made
to that effect, respectable arguments can be marshalled only for obeying the law.
This position seems extreme, but this is partly a consequence of
moral skepticism, not of formal justice alone. The arguments for discounting moral appraisal of the law are unimpressive; indeed, it is
difficult to identify any clear arguments at all. But this need not detain
us. I shall later examine Perelman's suggestion that formal administrative justice rests on the precept that like cases be treated alike.21 For
the present, one may simply observe that formalists could develop more
moderate positions; some in fact have done so. Many seem to accept
the idea that administrative justice always requires adherence to the
law, while acknowledging that it might conflict with other respectable
principles of justice. For example, Patterson does not reject the notion
of "justice according to law" (that is, the application of "established
rules and principles of law"), but only notes that it may conflict with
and may be outweighed by "social expediency and justice. '22 Fuller
believes that
there lies in the concept of justice itself a hidden conflict or tension
between opposing conceptions of the end sought by justice. On the
one hand, there is what has been called legal justice, a justice which
demands that we stick by the announced rules and not make exceptions in favour of particular individuals, a justice which conceives
that men should live under the same "rule of law" and be equally
bound by its terms. On the other hand, there is the justice of dispensation, a justice ready to make exceptions when the established
ready
rules work unexpected hardship in particular cases, a justice
28
to bend the letter of the law to accomplish a fair result.
This sort of view is given formalistic underpinnings and developed
further by Benn and Peters, who believe that "[t]o act justly ... is to
treat all men alike except where there are relevant differences between
them."24 They insist upon "a distinction between unjust administra21 Cf. notes 40-48 and accompanying text infra.
22 E. PATTERSON, JURISPRUDENCE: MIEN AND IDEAS OF THE LAw 104-06 (1953).
23 L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW 38 (1968) (emphasis in original). Fuller quotes
Freud as holding that justice "demands that a law once made will not be broken in favour
of an individual." Id. at 64.
24 S. BENN & R. PETERS, supra note 1, at 128.
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tion of the law and an unjust law." 25 But when the law speaks clearly,
they maintain that justice in its administration requires adherence to
it. They do not shrink from the formalistic consequences, acknowledging, for example, that
we should have to admit that a South African judge applying racial
discriminatory laws was doing justice, so long as he decided according to the law and nothing else....
.. . The judge may act justly in denying a man the vote
because he has a black skin, if that is the law; but we can still
question whether the criterion established by the law is itself
26
defensible.
Perelman now falls into this camp; he remains a formalist but accepts
the possibility of rational argument about substantive standards.2 7 He
thus opens the door to arguments against official compliance based on
extralegal considerations. The most important development of a moderate formalistic view has been suggested by H. L. A. Hart, who does
not seem skeptical of moral appraisal of laws or of moral considerations
28
generally.
I do not claim that all these writers would insist upon the view
that I call "formal justice." I wish to emphasize, however, that the
view I am constructing and criticizing is not my own invention. Some
of the arguments for it29 have been gleaned from discussions,8 0 but the
chief ones81 exist more or less whole in the literature, although they
need some sympathetic reconstruction. I have also refined the view
under discussion to eliminate extreme implications that seem inessential. My purpose is to expose a clearly discernible tendency in legal
and political theory, and I would not want formal justice rejected for
inadequate reasons, only to reappear later in more presentable garb.
The task seems worth the effort, for both theoretical and practical
reasons. Formalistic notions of justice misplace value by valuing mere
form, thereby obscuring the essential connection between justice and
25 Id. at 129.
28 Id. at 128-29.
27 See C. PERELMAN, supra note 1, at 85-86. See also C. PERELMAN, JUSTICE 53-87 (1967).
28 Hart's views are discussed in notes 39-56 and accompanying text infra.
29 See notes 33-38 and accompanying text infra.
30 In discussions of earlier versions of this paper, which were read at several universities in England (London, Oxford, Sussex) and America (Cornell, Maryland, Virginia,

Rockefeller, Wisconsin), I heard formal justice defended so often that I am persuaded
the published claims are but the tip of a generally unarticulated iceberg of hunches and
convictions. I am grateful to the many discussants on those occasions for their stimulating
and helpful comments.
31 See notes 39-56 and accompanying text infra.
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the treatment of persons. Acceptance of formal justice interferes with
our attempts to understand justice and to determine whether there
are, after all, any intersubjectively valid principles. 32 I have also suggested what is morally at stake. At minimum, a formalist maintains
that acting within the law is a necessary condition of justice in its administration, and thus that any official deviation is an injustice. Formal justice thus implies that there is always a real moral objection to
official deviation from the law-however iniquitous the laws may be,
whatever they require or allow, however horrendous the consequences
of official obedience, and regardless of all other circumstances. Formal
justice holds that this objection cannot be diminished even by full
knowledge of all the relevant facts. In other words, formal justice
maintains that official departure from the law is like the breach of a
basic moral principle.
This point should not be exaggerated. Claims of formal justice
do not absolutely condemn official disobedience under all circumstances. It may be said, however, that formal justice always argues for
official compliance with existing laws under all circumstances. Therefore, if formal justice claims are unsound, they serve to mount invalid
objections to official disobedience, and thus they foster excessive reverence for existing law. For example, formal justice principles make
it seem easier than it really is to argue soundly for official compliance
with unjust laws, and more difficult to justify official noncompliance.
This result is particularly objectionable when injustice could be
avoided by official departure from the law, for those who would be
wronged by its application are refused relief on the basis of a spurious
requirement of justice, perhaps by officials or others who, by virtue
of their own social positions, are likely to be beneficiaries of the unjust
arrangements.
I do not contend that officials should always disobey unjust or
otherwise defective laws. This conclusion does not follow from a denial
of formal justice. Factors exist favoring official adherence to the law,
32 This work has already received fresh impetus from the appearance of John Raws's
long-awaited book, A Theory of Justice, in 1971. It is interesting to note that Rawls
appears at first to accept formal justice (see J. RALWs, A THEoRY OF JusricE 58-60 (1971))
but later seems to reject the concept. See id. at 348-49. In the former place, Rawls cites
Henry Sidgwick, who comes close to endorsing formal justice himself, for Sidgwick sometimes seems to identify justice with treating like cases alike. See H. SmGwlcK, THE METHODS
oF ETHics 209, 267, 379-80, 496 (7th ed. 1962). But Sidgwick's view is unclear, for he does not

seem to regard this kind of justice as an independent moral value-one that might conflict,
for example, with other nonequivalent values. Thus, the sort of concern that Sidgivick
manifests about the possible conflict of Egoism and Benevolence (see id. at 497-509) is
not exhibited here.
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even when injustice will result-factors which may outweigh those
favoring noncompliance. My point is that justice, even administrative
justice, depends upon the circumstances.
Formal justice is, then, the view that official deviation from the
law is a kind of injustice, regardless of the circumstances. I say "a kind
of injustice" because the most plausible formalist position would allow
for recognition of other kinds of injustice, such as injustice in the laws
themselves, in legal or other institutions, and in social systems. I am
concerned here only with justice in the administration of the law, and
my discussion is meant to be neutral with respect to a variety of views
about the other branches of justice.
One may allow the formalist to say that official deviation from
the law, while always a kind of injustice, may sometimes be justified.
Such conduct need not be wrong, all things considered. As I have
already mentioned, some formalists have suggested the contrary; but
we should allow for the more plausible position. Thus, the formalist
can acknowledge other moral factors which have a bearing upon official conduct and maintain that those favoring deviation may outweigh
those favoring adherence (including formal justice) in specific cases.
Moreover, since he can also recognize other kinds of justice, such as
that of the laws themselves, he may hold that worse injustice may
sometimes be done by following than by departing from the law, for
example, when the law itself is unjust. For this reason, he may wish
to balance the various factors that relate to justice in a given case, and
although he regards official deviation from the law as a kind of injustice, he may sometimes decline to characterize an official deviation as
"unjust" overall. But the formalist nevertheless does believe something
like the following: justice in the administration of the law fundamentally requires official adherence in all cases. Any official departure
from the law is like the breach of a basic principle-it may sometimes
be justified, but it always requires justification, for there is an ineradicable moral objection to the departure.
Three further preliminary points should be made. First, as has
already been mentioned, we are concerned here only with the behavior
of persons acting in an official capacity. Formalists might maintain that
injustice is done whenever anyone breaks the law. This position would
be more difficult to defend, and formalists do not take it. I shall criticize the more modest and less vulnerable contention.
Second, distinctions may be made among different ways of "administering" the law (for example, enforcing, interpreting, and applying
the law) and among different spheres of official conduct (for example,
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the administration of substantive and procedural law). But formalists
employ none of these distinctions; they are clearly irrelevant to the
basic points at issue here and may therefore be ignored.
Third, I assume that laws are morally neutral in the sense that
a given law can be either just or unjust. It is not that laws are immune
from moral appraisal, but rather that laws are not necessarily either
all just or all unjust. This may seem to beg a central question, for if
one assumed that all laws were just (and also that injustice would
always be done by departing from them), then the claims of formal
justice would be harder to deny. I have two reasons for not making
this assumption. First, it is implausible. Second, formalists do not rely
upon it. They regard laws as morally neutral in the relevant sense and
indeed insist upon the independence of justice in the law and justice
in their administration. In omitting this unreasonable assumption, one
does not deny any of the formalists' premises.
II
APPLICATION OF FORMAL JUSTICE CLAIMS

One route to formal justice proceeds as follows. If one considers
any law, one can imagine some applications of it that are unjust and
others that are invulnerable to such criticism. This can be done whether
the law in question is just or unjust. For example, a rent administrator
might be biased toward landlords and always settle disputes in their
favor, without seriously considering the merits of the tenants' cases;
a judge might discriminate against blacks in his sentencing and rulings; a prosecutor might be gentle with his friends and harsh with his
enemies. These examples may seem to involve injustice, but they do
not turn upon the justice or injustice (or more generally the morality
or immorality) of the particular laws being administered. The respective injustices appear rooted not in the laws but in the way they are
administered. In particular, injustice seems to arise simply because the
laws have not been followed by officials. The rent administrator, for
example, is supposed to base his decisions on the merits of the cases,
as determined by the applicable laws or regulations, and not on whim,
prejudice, or personal interest. The judge who discriminates against
blacks without official sanction exceeds his lawful authority. This is
not to deny that injustice could also be done if the judge simply followed a law which required such discrimination; but that is another
point entirely. Similar considerations apply to the prosecutor in the

1973]

FORMAL JUSTICE

third example. These considerations suggest that mere failure by officials to follow the laws they administer constitutes an injustice.
Another example might run as follows. You and I commit similar
unlawful acts, and there are no grounds for treating us differently.
But you are accused, tried, convicted, and punished for your act, while
I am left alone, even though my conduct was not secret. You might
complain that injustice has been done,33 the cause of which appears to
be officials' failure to follow the law. I shall now change the example
slightly to show that this difference in treatment can occur even under
an unjust law. Suppose that a law is established only after we have
acted, so that what had been lawful conduct when we did it is now
unlawful. Other things being equal, any penalties imposed pursuant
to this ex post facto law would be unjust. But, even here, injustice
can result from the way in which the law is administered. For example,
imagine that we are both tried and convicted, but while I am punished
within the limits of the law, you receive exceptionally harsh treatment,
not authorized by the law. We could then both complain of injustice
because of prosecution under a retroactive criminal law. But you would
seem to have additional ground for complaint, based on the manner
in which the law was administered.
Such examples suggest that the justice of laws is independent of
justice in their administration. Formal justice readily explains this observation by saying that laws, either just or unjust, are the basic standards of administrative justice, at least in the sense that acting within
the law is a necessary condition of justice in its administration. By
this view, whatever standards of justice apply to laws cannot be identical to the standards that apply to official conduct. The examples
given above also suggest that a premium be placed upon official adherence to the law, since injustice seems to be done precisely when
officials fail to follow the law. Formal justice accounts for this condition directly. It may appear, therefore, that formal justice has explanatory power, accounting for the data observed in such examples. One
is tempted to conclude that formal justice is needed to account for the
relevant moral phenomena.
But these conclusions would be hasty, for, upon reflection, it becomes quite clear that formal justice is not mandated by such examples.
One can understand, for example, how administrative justice can be
independent of the justice of laws without supposing that official de33 This position may be maintained even if it is agreed that there were independent,

valid, and sufficient reasons for selective prosecution. To agree, for example, that sometimes a small injustice may legitimately be done to prevent a greater evil is not to deny
that the small injustice would be done.
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viation from the law per se must be disvalued. When laws themselves
are judged, we either consider how they have actually worked in practice or else assume some predictable degree of compliance by officials.
But when we judge how laws are administered, we judge official behavior itself. These two branches of justice can be conceived of independently even if similar factors are relevant to the appraisal of both.
For example, both branches concern certain ways in which people are
affected by the law, but each concerns them differently. In the appraisal of one, we would consider the effects that can be attributed to
the laws themselves, while in the other, we would consider the effects
ascribable to public officials. Thus, we need not conclude that administrative justice is formalistic in order to account for the independence
of these two types of moral appraisal.
The examples given do, in fact, support the conclusion that administrative injustice concerns not merely official departure from the
law but also the ways in which people are treated under it, such as the
relative disadvantages they suffer at the hands of administrators. In some
cases, it was hypothesized also that the offending officials were moved
by certain attitudes, such as bias or self-seeking. It seems clear that factors such as the treatment of individuals and the attitudes of administrators will enter into any satisfactory and complete account of justice
in the administration of the law. Formal justice, however, has absolutely nothing to say about such factors, which go well beyond the
mere idea of official departure from existing law. In other words, nonformal factors are available to account for the administratively infficted
injustices of our hypothetical cases. Furthermore, it is difficult to
imagine a case in which injustice seems intuitively to be done by
official deviation which has no adverse effect upon anyone at all. When
such nonformal factors are present, it seems that they, rather than
mere official departure from the law, are morally relevant.
So much for the notion that formal justice is required to account
for the independence of the justice of laws from justice in their administration. What about another point suggested by the examplesa general presumption favoring official adherence to the law? The strategy of offering alternative explanations that I have just employed would
seem to work here also.
The examples show that official deviations often threaten to cause
injustice of the nonformal variety. These injustices are a serious matter. Any risk of them should be undertaken reluctantly. In the normal
case in which individuals are likely to be affected by official action, the
danger of injustice being done by departure from the law may always
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be assumed present, and this danger can help to explain a kind of presumption favoring official adherence. But the relevant injustices turn
upon the ways individuals suffer under administrators; their actual
occurrence, even when officials fail to follow the law, always depends
upon the circumstances of such deviation. Complete knowledge of a
case might show that official departure would not cause a relevant injustice. In other words, one can understand the temptation to suppose
that there is always a moral objection to official disobedience, but one
need not agree that such an objection always exists.
This point may be reinforced in at least two ways. First, public
officials are usually thought to have special obligations to uphold the
law that they are charged with administering. Such obligations should
not be confused with formal justice, but belief in them can illicitly
lend credibility to formal justice claims, for their requirements are
similar. An official deviation could, for example, seem to count both
as the breach of such an obligation and as the breach of a formalistic
principle of administrative justice. Nevertheless, one may acknowledge
such obligations while denying formal justice claims, and belief in the
former also commits one to a kind of presumption favoring official
adherence to the law.84
Second, official deviations, as is often pointed out, are very likely
to have some disutility.8 5 For example, if we rely upon officials to act
within the law, then we are likely to suffer (or at least to be inconvenienced) when they fail to do so. Other disadvantages may attend the
inability to rely on officials to follow the law. Considerations such as
these apply to an enormously wide and varied range of cases and circumstances, under both just and unjust laws, and thus tend to support
another kind of presumption favoring official adherence. They rest,
however, upon contingent and circumstantial factors, for official deviations do not necessarily cause disutility. Thus, they do not support
a presumption that is unaffected by the circumstances. Full knowledge
of a case might show that no disutility would result from official deviation.
In short, the factors enumerated thus far tend to favor official ad34 See section IV infra.

85 Cf. B. BARRY, POLITIcAL ARGUMENT 97-105 (1965). Analogous points about the value
of excuses and limitations on punishment are made by H.L.A. Hart. See, e.g., H.LA.
HARr, PuNIsHuENT AND RESPONSmrILrY 22-24, 44-49, 181-83 (1968). Hart elsewhere suggests
a nonformalistic treatment of justice in the administration of the law. See Hart, Philosophy
of Law, Problems of, in 6 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 274 (P. Edwards ed. 1967).
But such considerations are absent from this discussion of the topic in The Concept of
Law. See notes 39-56 and accompanying text infra.
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herence to the law, but they are distinct from and cannot support
formal justice claims. An argument for formal justice cannot rely on
contingent or circumstantial factors.38
These objections to the first argument for formal justice do not,
of course, completely discredit the entire notion. But they do eliminate
one possible reason for believing that official deviation from the law
per se must be disvalued in the name of injustice, regardless of the
circumstances. And if this appeal to the explanatory power of formal
justice were the only argument in its favor, its attraction would undoubtedly be quite limited. Radically different sorts of arguments have
also been advanced, however, which seek to ground formal justice upon
the concept of justice itself.37 Before examining them, I shall note the
limits of an objection to formal justice that is also based upon examples.
One might try to present a real or hypothetical (but not implausible) counterexample to formal justice. Suppose that a morally indefensible law prescribes extermination for all members of a certain
group. Under this law, a judge is presented with information so that
he may decide a question of fact, such as whether the person in question belongs to the designated group. Let us imagine that a particular
judge has remained on the bench in desperate hope of somehow doing
some good, believing that he could do none elsewhere, and knowing
that he would be replaced by a zealous racist if he resigned. Suppose
further that he follows this law until one day a supervisor is absent
from the court, and our judge has the chance to save a single person
from the deadly net. To do this, he must fail to follow perfectly clear
provisions of the law, for example, the rules of evidence. He does this,
and the one life that he is able to save while acting in his official capacity is thereby saved.
Has this judge acted wrongly? All things considered, I would
suppose that he does right in breaking the law and saving the life he
is able to save. 8 It is not clear that any case could be made for saying
36 I am prepared to admit that it may be useful-and may even serve the interests
of justice-to inculcate in lawyers and officials a deep conviction that official deviation

from the law is always unjust or otherwise wrong, for this might help dissuade some
from official misconduct. But this does not mike such a conviction true, nor does it clearly

justify the required deliberate oversimplification of moral issues. One must also consider

the disadvantages of dogmatic and conservative attitudes on the part of those who may
be called upon to administer unjust and inhumane laws, policies, and directives, with

their consequent failure to face the difficult moral issues squarely. Unfortunately, such
issues are often regarded much too crudely, as if the choice were simply between "the
rule of law" and "anarchism." Formal justice may encourage just such blindness in officials.
37 See notes $9-56 and accompanying text infra.
38 It should be noted that my question concerns the judge's failure to follow the
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that this judge acted unjustly in failing to follow the law. Who, for
example, is to be regarded as the victim of the judge's injustice? Surely
the person who is saved is not the victim. Nor does it seem plausible
to maintain that those he had already sent to the extermination camps
are victims of an injustice done by the act in question, because a new
murder has been averted. However, someone may grasp upon the obvious difference in treatment accorded those who pass before the judge.
For example, one may assume that those already sent to the camps
deserved no worse treatment than the one who fared better. But even
if this argument seems to be a ground for saying that injustice is done
by the judge's failure to follow the law in the instant case, the argument does not show that his mere failure to follow the law constitutes
an injustice, which is what the formalist contends. The charge of injustice here rests on the differences in treatment dispensed by the
judge. It should be emphasized that failure to follow the law does not
necessarily result in such differences of treatment; it does not even
mean that anyone will be affected.
Despite this analysis, the formalist may continue to insist that the
judge has acted unjustly in departing from the law. He believes this
because he thinks that there are general arguments for formal justice.
He also regards this case as parallel to others in which it seems more
obvious that injustice is done simply by departing from the law. To
deal with formalism, therefore, one must undermine its entire rationale.
Moreover, while insisting that injustice has been done, the formalist can readily agree to our overall judgment in this case. He can,
consistently, admit that for the judge to save the life is the right thing
to do, because he can agree that an injustice may be justified when all
factors are considered. Under the theory of formal justice I have constructed, a formalist can maintain that official deviation from the law,
though in itself unjust or the breach of a basic principle, may sometimes be justified by overriding considerations. A small injustice, for
example, which could help to save many innocent lives, might not be
wrong, all things considered. The failure to follow an unjust law may
also result in less injustice than adherence to it and might thereby be
justified. The formalist can accept these points, but since he maintains
that justice in the administration of the law is independent of other
branches of justice and fundamentally requires adherence to the law,
regardless of circumstances, he counts even these justified departures
law this once, not his following the genocidal law before. Neither am I judging his decision to remain on the bench. These questions, while important, are also separable, as
the formalist must agree, and they need not be decided here.
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from the law as injustices. They may be small departures, but they are
regarded as injustices nevertheless. This classification is the distinctive
claim of formal justice. However, although the requirements of formal
justice are not supposed to depend on circumstances (including under
this head the morality of the laws to be applied), other moral factors
do depend on circumstances, and so the formalist can agree that what
is right or wrong for a public official to do, all things considered, depends upon the circumstances. It follows that formal justice cannot
be discredited merely by our conclusion that the judge's departure
from the genocidal law was morally justifiable. With this the formalist
could agree. Formal justice thus resists quick and easy refutation.
Likewise, it is not wildly implausible. But these are not, of course,
arguments for formal justice. To the chief ones I now turn.
III
ARGuMENTS FoR FORMAL JUSTICE
The arguments to be considered are recognizable as arguments
for formal justice because they do not turn at all upon contingent
factors. They present a noncontingent connection between administrative injustice and official deviation from the law.
H.L.A. Hart offers the most important formalist propositions in
The Concept of Law. In fairness, one should note that Hart is at least
as much concerned with refuting old-fashioned legalism as with promoting formal justice. He argues, for example, that justice cannot consist in "conformity to law," because laws themselves are judged to be
just or unjust, and not simply by reference to other laws. 9 Although
acknowledging justice, the old formula ignores such criticisms and even
seems to exclude the possibility of an unjust law. However, Hart concedes too much to legalism by endorsing a formalistic account of justice
in the administration of the law.
My discussion will center upon three points in Hart's brief treatment of the topic. The first bases administrative justice on the precept
"treat like cases alike"; the second grounds it on a notion with which
the first is often confused, namely, following a rule; the third is rooted
in the idea of impartially applying the law to particular cases. These
notions are worth examining closely because suggestions of formal justice are often expressed in such terms.
89 H.L.A. HART, supra note 1, at 157.
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A. Treating Like Cases Alike
Hart believes that "a central element in the idea of justice" is
expressed by the precept "treat like cases alike and different cases
differently."40 This bare precept, however, "cannot afford any determinate guide to conduct" 41 and must be supplemented. "This is so
because any set of human beings will resemble each other in some
respects and differ from each other in others and, until it is established
what resemblances and differences are relevant, 'Treat like cases alike'
must remain an empty form."4 2 The bare precept requires neither
more nor less than uniform treatment. Of course, there are innumerable
ways of treating cases uniformly, depending upon which features of
persons, acts, and circumstances one considers relevant. There are as
many possible interpretations for the precept "treat like cases alike."
But justice requires more than mere uniformity of treatment. Some
systematic ways of dealing with cases are just and others are unjust,
and the bare precept does not help us to distinguish one from another.
Hart concludes that there are two parts to the idea of justice, "a uniform or constant feature, summarized in the precept 'Treat like cases
alike' and a shifting or varying criterion used in determining when,
for any given purpose, cases are alike or different."4' 3
I am not persuaded that this approach to analyzing the concept
of justice is very promising, for the idea of treating like cases alike does
not appear to have any special connection with justice. This seems true,
at least, if we agree that justice does not consist simply in treating
cases systematically; it requires certain kinds of treatment for certain
classes of persons. But the same notion obtains for other aspects of
morality, such as the requirement that one fulfill promises or that
one come to the aid of those in need; these likewise require "treating
like cases alike" according to specified patterns. For present purposes,
however, this qualm can be suppressed. One may agree that justice
requires some kind of uniform behavior. But what kind? Of what
classes of persons? And in what circumstances?
Hart does not attempt to answer these traditionally contested questions in discussing the justice of the laws themselves. But he finds no
difficulties when he turns to justice in the administration of the law:
In certain cases, indeed, the resemblances and differences be40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43

at 155.

Id. at 156.
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tween human beings which are relevant for the criticism of legal
arrangements as just or unjust are quite obvious. This is preeminently the case when we are concerned not with the justice or injustice of the law but of its applicationin particular cases. For here
the relevant resemblances and differences between individuals, to
which the person who administers the law must attend, are determined by the law itself. To say that the law against murder is
justly applied is to say that it is impartially applied to all those
and only those who are alike in having done what the law forbids;
no prejudice or interest has deflected the administrator from treating them "equally."44
Hart's claim seems to be that the law provides the basic standard to be
followed by a public official. He implies that an official who departs
from the law thereby acts unjustly, regardless of the rules, the consequences, and other circumstances.
From the parts of Hart's discussion considered so far, it may appear as if he believes that this conclusion follows from a direct application of the requirement that like cases be treated alike. Hart
realizes, however, that the bare precept "treat like cases alike" is "an
empty form," 45 and as the argument for using it seems so obviously
invalid, I am hesitant to impute it to him. Nevertheless, it is the main
basis that Perelman, for example, suggests for his own formal justice
claims, 46 and it should therefore be considered. I believe, moreover,
that this is the main theoretical prop ostensibly supporting formalistic
tendencies among philosophers.
From the premises that justice fundamentally requires a uniform
treatment of cases and that the law prescribes one way of uniformly
dealing with them, we are asked to conclude that justice in the administration of the law requires officials to follow the law. But this
argument begs the question at issue, which is whether the pattern of
treatment prescribed by law is identical (or even compatible) with the
pattern required by justice. Once we realize that the justice of a law
is not determined by the law, or in other words that the resemblances
and differences between persons, acts, and circumstances which the law
tells us to consider are not necessarily the ones that justice says we may
consider, the error of the formalist becomes obvious.
A formalist might object that his claim is only supposed to account
for justice in the administration of the law; it is not supposed to exhaust
44 Id. (emphasis in original).
45 Id. at 155.
46 See C. PmmuLAN, supra note 1, at 16, 29, 86-41.
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all of justice, including that of the laws themselves. But this really
makes no difference. Why should we suppose that the pattern of treatment prescribed by the law is the same as (or even compatible with)
that prescribed by any principle of justice? An argument based on the
idea of treating like cases alike gives us no reason at all.
The argument could be valid if certain assumptions were true. One
might imagine, for example, that the only possible way for officials to
deal with cases uniformly would be by following the law, as if failing
to follow the law somehow guaranteed that cases would not be dealt
with in a uniform manner.47 But such an assumption would clearly
be false. An official can deal with cases uniformly without following
the law; that is, his conduct may fit another pattern, which does not
perfectly follow the law, but requires some unauthorized actions. Corrupt officials who take bribes or who for some other reason act systematically in a partial or prejudiced manner, although breaking legal
rules, can sometimes act with permanent legal effect. Such actions are
a kind of uniform behavior, implemented according to a uniform pattern. Thus, appeal to the bare precept "treat like cases alike" is not
sufficient to show that justice requires following the law.
At this point, formalists may say that they are not invoking merely
the bare precept "treat like cases alike"; appeal is also being made to
something special about the law. But what is this unique characteristic?
I have mentioned that the possibility of construing legal rules as prescribing a way of "treating like cases alike" is of no help, for such rules
prescribe only one of many possible patterns.
I have also given some reasons why injustice can be linked with
official deviation from the law.48 But these connections are contingent;
they depend upon the circumstances of each case. Arguments appealing
to them cannot possibly give aid or comfort to the formalist. It should
also be obvious that arguments for such connections make appeal to
the precept "treat like cases alike" entirely unnecessary.
B. Following a Rule
Hart suggests a second argument for formal justice when he observes:
The connexion between this aspect of justice and the very notion
of proceeding by rule is obviously very close. Indeed, it might be
47 This is not the same as saying that the only just way for officials to deal with
cases uniformly is by following the law, for this would again simply beg the question.
48

See pp. 838-42 supra.
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said that to apply a law justly to different cases is simply to take
seriously the assertion that what is to be applied in different cases
is the same general rule, without prejudice, interest, or caprice.49
This is a new argument, for the notion of applying a rule is dearly
not equivalent to that of treating like cases alike. The precept "treat
like cases alike" makes no reference to rules at all. It can be followed
by devising a uniform treatment of cases even when no relevant rules
exist, for example, by comparing current cases among themselves. When
a judge does this, he cannot be construed to be following an existing
legal rule, even though he may create a new one. It is also possible to
apply an existing rule without treating like cases alike, for example,
by applying a rule for the first time to the case at bar.
Hart's suggestion may be elaborated into an argument along the
following lines. From the premise that an official should apply a given
rule, it follows that his behavior is subject to adverse criticism if he
fails to do what the rule prescribes. The mere notion of applying a
rule to particular cases might therefore be said to generate a principle
by which behavior can be judged. This principle takes no account of
what the rules require or allow, of what their effects are likely to be,
or of particular circumstances. When there are rules for officials to
apply, this principle is necessarily operative, and they are bound by
it. It requires that the rules be applied exactly, without deviation in
any respect.50
Such an argument does not necessitate an extreme legalistic position, nor does it mean that public officials must always follow the law.
It can be taken as an account of one principle of justice, which can
conceivably be overridden.
But is the outcome really a principle of justice? The argument
turns entirely on the notion of applying a rule to particular cases; it
contains no further restrictions. If the result were a principle of justice, then any deviation from any rule that one is supposed to apply
would be, in itself, an unjust act. Nothing restricts this mode of argument to the conduct of public officials, or even to the law. For that
reason, it seems clear that the argument must fail, for either it works
H.L.A. HART, supra note 1, at 156-57. See also C. PERELMAN, supra note 1, at 36-45.
G0 If this argument were sound it would be of special interest for supporting a traditional natural law contention, namely, that there is a significant, necessary connection
between law and morals because the principle requiring adherence to legal rules would
seem to be implicit in the law by virtue of the fact that every legal system contains some
rules. For another attempt to show such a connection, see L. FULR, THEu MoRrrY oF
LAw (1964). I have discussed Fuller's suggestions elsewhere. See Lyons, The Internal
Morality of Law, 71 PRec. AnasrOTELIAN Soc'Y 105, 105-19 (1970-71).
49
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for all kinds of rules, regardless of the circumstances, or it -works for
none. And it clearly does not work for some. To see this, one need only
select a rule the breach of which has no necessary moral significance,
regardless of the circumstances. The charge of injustice carries moral
weight, and if the breach of some rule does not automatically carry
such weight, then it cannot be an unjust act. Suppose, then, that when
I speak ungrammatically I can be said to break a rule of language. The
argument would have it that I thereby commit an unjust act. But this
is implausible. Of course, I can do wrong by misusing language, but
whether what I do is not only grammatically incorrect but also morally
wrong, some kind of injustice, or the violation of a basic moral principle, would seem to depend on contingent circumstances.
A formalist might agree that departures from some rules are not
always unjust, but insist that departure from existing law, at least by
officials responsible for administering it, is always a kind of injusticethat there is something special about that kind of rule breaking. This
is an intelligible contention, but one has been given no reason to
accept it. Another argument is needed.
The problem is as follows. Insofar as official nonconformity to law
is regarded merely as the failure to follow rules, it is implausible to regard it as a kind of injustice. Is there anything else essential to official
noncompliance that would provide the required link? It must be something essential to this kind of rule breaking, that is, something independent of all circumstances. Otherwise, a formal justice claim cannot
be supported, for formal justice maintains that official disobedience is
always morally objectionable, regardless of the circumstances. If one
invokes considerations linking deviation with injustice in a contingent
manner, that is, dependent on the circumstances, one has no argument
for formal justice.
I cannot think of anything to fulfill the formalistic requirements,
but it is worth emphasizing what will not work. It can be argued, as
I have shown, that official deviation from the law is likely to cause
injustice involving, e.g., mistreatment of individuals. But these are
risks; actual injustices depend upon the concrete circumstances. Sometimes it can be certain that injustice will result from misadministration
of the law, but this sort of argument also suggests that sometimes no
injustice will be done at all. When such cases arise, there can be no
objection, based on injustice, to official deviation from the law.
C. Impartially Applying the Law to ParticularCases
Each of the direct arguments for formal justice that I have con-
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sidered can be criticized in yet another way, namely, that they lead to
the conclusion that following the law is sufficient as well as necessary
for administrative justice. This conclusion, however, seems much too
simple a conception. Even if one agrees that justice in the administration of the law cannot be done unless the law is followed, one may
still wish to say that justice requires more than merely acting within
the limits laid down by the law.
In his remarks on justice, Hart suggests a much more plausible
view, namely, that administrative justice consists in applying the law
impartially to particular cases. For example, while invoking the idea
of treating like cases alike, Hart maintains:
To say that the law against murder is justly applied is to say that
it is impartially applied to all those and only those who are alike
in having done what the law forbids; no prejudice or interest
has
5
deflected the administrator from treating them "equally." 1
A similar qualification seems indicated when Hart appeals to the notion of proceeding by rule:
Indeed, it might be said that to apply a law justly to different cases
is simply to take seriously the assertion that what is to be applied
to different cases 5is2 the same general rule, without prejudice,
interest, or caprice.
Although the standard of impartiality is invoked by Hart when
he suggests the first two arguments for formal justice, it plays no apparent role in either of them. Moreover, appeal to impartiality goes
beyond the ideas of proceeding by rule and treating like cases alike.
This point should be emphasized. Impartiality is not implicit in the
ideas of treating like cases alike or proceeding by rule. Although impartiality may require some kind of uniform behavior, merely to deal
with cases in a uniform manner is not to be impartial. An official might
systematically favor one group over others as a consequence of personal
prejudice or interest, and get uniform results. Likewise, impartiality
is not implicit in proceeding by rule, because rules leave areas of discretion.
What difference can considerations of impartiality make to the formalist's position? In answering this question, it is useful to contrast
formalists who have different conceptions of a legal system. Suppose,
first, that a formalist conceives of the law as a set of rules that officials
can apply "mechanically" to cases as they arise, in the sense that officials can actually follow the law only in one way. If they do one thing,
51 H.L.A. HART, supra note 1, at 156 (emphasis added).
52 Id. at 156-57 (emphasis added).
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they follow the law; if they do anything else, they fail to follow it. This
means that there is only one way for officials to administer the law
justly, for formalists maintain, at the least, that official departure from
the law is an injustice. Such a "mechanical" formalist is therefore
obliged to embrace the overly simple formal justice claim that justice
in the administration of the law consists in following it; deviation from
the law would then be seen as both a necessary and a sufficient condition of administrative injustice.
How would this kind of formalist conceive of and value impartiality? He could not regard it as an essential element of administrative
justice; it could not enter into his basic position. He could value it,
however, in at least two other ways. On the one hand, its absence could
be seen as one possible, contingent cause of deviation from the law and
thus of injustice. On the other hand, he could value it as a cast of mind
that is intrinsically fitting for a public official. But, either way, impartiality would add nothing of relevance to the formalist's position. It
would not repair the defects of the views that we have already considered.
The appeal to impartiality can make a substantial difference to the
formalist's position-a difference relevant to our concerns--only if he
does not accept a "mechanical" conception of the law but believes instead that officials sometimes face alternative lines of lawful behavior
and must often make significant choices in administering the law. If
the formalist also believes that the choice of lawful alternatives is subject to criticism in the name of justice, then he must qualify his formal
justice claim accordingly, because the simple requirement that officials
act within the law does not enable the formalist to differentiate between the lawful alternatives. To evaluate them, the formalist must
supplement that requirement with some other extralegal standard. For
when officials have such "discretion," strictly speaking, the binding
guidance of the law has been exhausted. Impartiality may then be invoked as a supplementary standard, to be applied when officials must
exercise discretion. The resultant view would be that, given the understanding that the law itself does not fully determine what constitutes
its own impartial application, administrative justice consists in applying the laws impartially to particular cases. Although incorporating
extralegal standards, such a view would still be formalistic in the original sense because it holds that adherence to existing law is a necessary
condition of administrative justice.
Hart himself argues that officials have discretion. 53 No legal rule
53 Id. at 121-50.
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or set of rules completely determines in all relevant respects how an
official is to deal with cases that arise. Legal rules cannot be applied
"mechanically"; there is always room for the exercise of official judgment. Lawmakers often deliberately allow for discretion in particular
cases, as when judges are authorized to fix punishments. But occasions
for exercising discretion also result from conflicts between laws, problems left untouched by laws, and vague or ambiguous laws, which
cannot entirely be eliminated.
An official's choice among lawful alternatives is subject to criticism
in the name of justice. Thus, the discretion that judges have in sentencing convicted offenders may be exercised impartially or partially;
police and prosecutors may ration their time and attention in a partial
or impartial manner. If these officials fail to act impartially, they may
be charged with injustice.
The claim that administrative justice requires impartial application of the law to particular cases is not inherently formalistic. One
might agree, for example, that the just way of applying the law is the
impartial way, while believing that justice may sometimes require that
officials not apply the law. The formalistic version of the claim maintains that impartial application of the existing rules of law fully embodies administrative justice, with the understanding that this claim
fundamentally requires officials to act within the limits laid down by
law. I wish to discredit the latter version.5"
This formula clearly may be thought to exhaust the topic of administrative justice because what an official essentially does is administer the law. If one goes beyond this formula, beyond the requirement
of impartial application of existing rules of law, it will be argued, one
is necessarily changing the topic, since one is no longer confining oneself to justice in the administration of the law.
I believe this to be a mistaken notion. I have already observed
that it is possible for an official to overstep the legal boundaries while
acting in his official capacity. The question remains whether such conduct must always be unjust, or the breach of a basic principle. In giving this reply, however, I am assuming that the question of justice in
the administration of the law is identical to or at least co-extensive
with the question of justice in official conduct. The formalist might
deny this for some reason. I see no way of arguing this particular point
directly, so I shall take a different tack.
54 The formalistic version can be ascribed to Hart because he offers the formula
within unquestionably formalistic arguments. For him, impartiality is required by administrative justice, but only within the limits laid down by the law. See text accompanying notes 51-52 supra.
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Let us assume that officials should, to do justice, be impartial; this
does not imply adherence to any particular set of rules, such as the
rules of law. Again, suppose that the only just way of applying the law
is the impartial way; it does not follow that an official who fails to follow the law acts unjustly. Let us agree that an application of the law
which is not impartial is unjust; it does not follow that all deviations
by officials from the law are unjust. For not every such departure could
be described as an application of the law that fails to be impartial. An
official might deliberately refuse to follow the law; this is not the same
as applying it in, for example, a biased or prejudiced manner. This distinction is important, for the official may refuse to follow the law on
principled grounds, precisely in order to prevent an injustice of which
he would be the instrument.
Is it possible for this to happen-for an official to prevent an injustice by refusing to follow the law, while avoiding other injustices?
If so, then mere deviation from the law by a public official does not
by itself constitute a kind of injustice. If one can give an affirmative
answer to this question, it will imply that the formula, "administrative
justice requires the impartial application of the law to particular cases,"
has only conditional force. It does not exhaust the topic of administrative justice, for if it did, and if the law were broken, then injustice
would be done.
An affirmative answer may be suggested by an example. Suppose
that Jones is an official responsible for administering a law that is unjust because it discriminates against blacks by depriving them of certain
benefits conferred upon whites. Jones realizes that he is in a position
to distribute benefits more equitably by using his office but without
following the law. Let us imagine that Jones so acts, thus exceeding
his official discretion. Must an injustice have been done? If one examines the situation and finds no one wronged, then one should look for
some other sign, mark, or symptom of injustice. If none is found, one
is left with no ground for confirming the claim that official deviation
from the law is inherently unjust.
None of those directly affected by the distribution made by Jones,
acting in defiance of the law, would seem to be wronged as a necessary
consequence. Some, indeed, are treated justly only because Jones refuses
to follow the law; they are surely not wronged on that account. Nor
are those in whose favor the law discriminates necessarily wronged, for
one can suppose that they receive the same benefits they would have
enjoyed had the law been followed; the class formerly discriminated
against is simply not given less. Can any other basis be found for say-
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ing that Jones's behavior is unjust? It would seem that all potential
arguments similarly turn upon contingent circumstances. For example,
Jones might expose others, such as official subordinates, to risks without
their knowledge and consent. This may seem to be a kind of injustice,
or at least some kind of moral wrong, but this complication is not
inevitable; he might protect others or he might act alone, assuming all
the risk himself. Again, he might find it necessary to deceive others in
order to carry off his plan successfully. But this fact-which has uncertain ties to the charge of injustice-also turns upon contingencies, for
deception might not be necessary. 55
There are many possible grounds for the charge of injustice or
some other kind of wrong when officials fail to follow the law. Benefits
or burdens may be distributed unjustly as a consequence, or someone
may fail to receive something that he deserves. But formal justice cannot rely upon any such "substantive" considerations since it maintains
that an official can act unjustly by simply failing to follow the law.
Injustice seems, however, to depend upon the surrounding circumstances. 55 At least, one has no reason at all to think otherwise.
IV
OFFICIAL OBLIGATIONS

Considerable illicit support for formal justice may derive from the
widespread conviction that officials have special obligations to uphold
the law. This conviction, properly qualified, is not implausible. But the
support it affords formal justice, even were it not illicit, would in any
case be insufficient.
Official obligations of allegiance to the law may readily appear to
bolster formal justice claims. Officials have a special relation to the law,
55 Once again, one may wish to note an official's special obligation of allegiance to
the law, which Jones has presumably incurred by accepting and retaining his position.
I shall discuss this point shortly.
56 One might construct less serious examples. Suppose a law prescribes a useless
ritual, for example, that a county clerk is required to spit twice out of the left side of
his mouth when certifying that a will has been witnessed in the required way. An official
might well be tempted to rebel, save for the fact that wills are regarded as invalid unless
this ritual has been performed. But suppose the official is certain that no one will know

if he performed the ritual, and he merely pretends to have done it. He thus fails to
follow perfectly clear provisions of the law. Has an injustice been done? Would the ansver
be any different if the ritual were required of the clerk but not required for the validation
of the will? Suppose the clerk refused to do it under those circumstances. Would he be
acting unjustly? Or perhaps only imprudently, assuming there were penalties for official
noncompliance?
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unlike ordinary citizens, for they are responsible for administering it.
This relation is part of what it is to be a public official. If those in
public office undertake and reaffirm obligations of fidelity to law, they
thereby provide a basis for criticism of their deviations from the law,
for any such deviation would seem to amount to the breach of such
an obligation. The case for formalistic requirements is strengthened
because it may appear that any official must be under such obligation
by virtue of his acceptance of and continuation in a position of public
trust. If so, the obligations always require official conformity to the law,
regardless of the circumstances.
The first difficulty with this line of reasoning arises from the fact
that formal justice pretends to give an account of what constitutes justice in the administration of the law. The argument demonstrating that
there are special obligations incumbent on officials has nothing to say
about such matters. The vice of an official who strays from the law is
not depicted as an injustice but rather as an infidelity or breach of
faith. What justice requires of him is something else.
Second, it is doubtful whether such obligations always give a reason for official conformity, regardless of the circumstances. Consider,
for example, the suggestion that a public official must always be under
such an obligation. This cannot be correct, for there may be circumstances in which no such obligations can be incurred or sustained. 57
One should not confuse the obligation in question with institutional
requirements; the question is whether a basis for moral criticism of officials who deviate from existing law is always present. It would seem
that the requisite conditions may be lacking. Suppose, for the moment,
that such an obligation arises when a person voluntarily accepts and
retains official responsibility; it does not follow that all officials have
such obligations, for one might be coerced into accepting or retaining
this position. It would then be -highly questionable whether such an
obligation had been incurred. The very existence of such obligations
therefore depends upon the circumstances, and another argument for
formalistic conclusions dissolves.
Even if voluntary acceptance and retention of official responsibility
are necessary to give rise to such an obligation, they may not be sufficient. One recognizes similar limits when arguing, for example, that
certain contracts are void ab initio because of their nature or subject
matter. Similarly, there may be circumstances in which no morally
57 Even if a person willingly accepts responsibility for implementing his government's
genocidal policies, it is doubtful that he thereby incurs a morally binding obligation to
discharge his official duties.
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binding commitment can be made, even if made of one's own free will,
or in which certain conduct could not be required. One might argue,
for example, that the judge in our earlier example58 was under no moral
obligation to follow the genocidal law he was charged with administering-and mean it strictly. This argument can be understood in one of
two ways, depending on the circumstances: either any obligation of
fidelity to his nation's laws that he had incurred was entirely extinguished, or such matters fall outside the scope of that obligation, in
which case he would still be obligated to follow other, innocuous laws.
A formalist who wishes to salvage as much as is possible from a
sinking ship may be tempted to object that the official obligation argument is unaffected even in such cases, for he can admit that such obligations can be overridden, and he may say that this has happened. The
obligation persists, even in the extreme case, but is simply outweighed.
If so, a formalist objection to official deviation from the law in such
cases remains.
However, this response will not save formal justice or even the
weaker claim that there is always some kind of moral objection to official deviation from the law, regardless of the circumstances, for, as I
have mentioned, officials are not always under such obligations, as, for
example, when they are coerced into serving.5 9 The reasoning behind
that point can be applied to my last. To say that voluntarily undertaking and retaining responsibility is a necessary condition of an obligation to uphold the law is not to draw a conclusion from conventional
rules; it is to make a moral judgment. The very idea that a person who
voluntarily accepts and retains a position of public trust incurs an "obligation" rests upon a moral conception of what constitutes a valid and
binding agreement, for the institutional rules do not necessarily recognize such limitations. Moral considerations are relied upon in claiming
that there is such an obligation, and the substance of such obligationswhat they are obligations to do or to refrain from doing-can likewise
be the subject of a moral judgment. Furthermore, by saying that someone who undertakes to administer the law incurs an obligation to uphold it, one is surely not bound to say that he is to be regarded as under
an obligation to do whatever the law requires of him, regardless of the
particular requirement, the effects of following it, and all other circumstances. A moral judgment is required here. Some acts, perhaps,
58 See text preceding note 38 supra.
59 One might be coerced into serving or remaining in office by threats to oneself or
one's family. A government might wish to do this to exploit the skills or prestige of certain individuals. It should be noted that, although examples of such coercion may be
found in recent history, the mere possibility of such cases is sufficient for the present point.
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are beyond an official's special obligation of allegiance to the law. In
other words, it is doubtful that a sound moral reason for a public official to abide by the law that he administers always exists, even when
he has voluntarily undertaken to uphold the law.
CONCLUSION

I have been appraising the notion that injustice is done whenever
an official fails to follow the law that he is charged with administering,
regardless of the circumstances. This notion, which I call "formal justice," appears to have several sources, but no firm foundations.
It is sometimes suggested that formal justice is required to account
for the distinction between justice in the administration of the law and
the justice of the laws themselves, as well as for the moral premium
placed on official adherence to the law. But I have shown that other
explanations are readily available. It has also been suggested that formal justice derives from the precept, at the heart of justice, that like
cases be treated alike, or from the notion of following a rule, which is
central to the law. But I have shown that these slender reeds cannot
support the weight of formal justice. I have considered the idea that
justice in the administration of the law involves the impartial application of the law to particular cases. This idea seems unobjectionable,
when understood to mean that the law should be impartially applied,
if and when one is justified in following it. But an appeal to the notion of impartiality cannot show that deliberate refusal to follow the
law is unjust. Finally, I have taken account of the conviction that
officials are under obligations of allegiance to the law, deriving from
their positions of public trust. These convictions are distinct from formal justice claims. Moreover, the arguments for such obligations would
not show that there is always a moral objection to official deviation
from the law, regardless of the circumstances.
Formal justice therefore seems theoretically unfounded. It appears
to be an exaggerated expression of otherwise legitimate concern for
justice in the administration of the law. But since it exaggerates the
case to be made for compliance with unjust and inequitable laws, it
is morally objectionable.

